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1Abstract
In ¯scal federal systems, local public works that generate spillovers are often
¯nanced by transfers from higher levels of government. In this article, we consider
a governmental hierarchy composed by a Federal and a Local Government. The
former delegates to the latter the task of ¯nding a ¯rm to undertake a local public
work. As the Local Government has more information about the e±ciency of the
¯rm, it communicates its private information to the Federal Government which
decides the way to fund the project.
If side-contracts between the local authority and the ¯rm in charge with con-
structing the project are feasible, di®erent stakes for collusion may arise. The
Local Government can overstate the e±ciency of the ¯rm to obtain extra rents
or can also understate it, to ensure the e®ective undertaking of the project. In
order to ¯nd the optimal allocations, we derive a \Collusion-Proofness" property
which states that, in order to maximize its expected welfare, the Federal Govern-
ment can restrict to o®er collusion-proof contracts. These contracts indicate the
transfers between the Federal Government, the local authority and the ¯rm of
constructors. Finally we characterize the distortions set to attenuate the result-
ing implementation costs. They concern the cost of the project and the decision
about its e®ective undertaking. The most important result of this article is that
the undertaking of useless projects, at an in°ated cost, is an optimal response of
the Federal Government to the threat of collusion between the local authorities
and the ¯rm of constructors.
21 Introduction
In ¯scal federal systems, local public works that generate spillovers are often
¯nanced by grants-in-aid from higher levels of government. When a Federal Gov-
ernment delegates to a local authority both the decision about the undertaking
of such projects and the search of a ¯rm of constructors, the Local Govern-
ment can try to obtain more funds than necessary. Those extra funds are either
private bene¯ts for the bureaucracy or jurisdictional gains for the constituency.
For example, if local authorities know better than the Federal Government the
information concerning the bene¯ts of a particular local public work, they can
manipulate their private information during the administrative procedures that
allocates federal grants-in-aid. But, if the information concerns the cost-side of
the project, there is also room for collusion or corruption between Local Govern-
ments and the ¯rms of constructors to obtain extra rents.
The second issue is an important empirical problem. Some evidence suggests
that in°ated infrastructure costs or useless local public works are the consequence
of collusion between local authorities and managers of ¯rms of constructors. Al-
though it is well known that this phenomenon is widespread in developing coun-
tries, some industrialized nations have also confronted problems of this kind. The
French magazine Le Point (1997) quoted, in an article describing some striking
local projects, \white elephants also exist in France".1
To deal with those issues, we study a governmental hierarchy, where a Local
Government ¯rst chooses a public work and a ¯rm in charge with constructing
it. Then, in order to obtain funds, the local authority presents the project to
the Federal Government because the latter is not able to observe ex ante its
cost. The model presented here is a straightforward extension of our previous
article (see Besfamille (1999)). There we analyze the impact of local interests
and multidimensional asymmetric information on the design of grants-in-aid that
a Federal Government sets to ¯nance local public works with spillovers. We
characterize the optimal contract o®ered by the Federal Government to the local
authority and to the ¯rm of constructors. The retained formalization enables
us to obtain some interesting results, specially the distortions concerning the
federal decisions wether to undertake the local project, distortions with respect
to the full information framework. These distortions imply that, depending on
the possible values of the local bene¯t of the project, more or less local public
works are constructed.
But in our previous article, side-contracts between the Local Government
and the ¯rm of constructors were infeasible. Here we relax this assumption hence
both the Local Government and the ¯rm can collude against the objectives of
the Federal Government. Although we maintain an assumption adopted in vari-
1The expression \white elephants" refers to large but useless projects (such as snow-plows
sent to Guinea) that were undertaken on behalf of the international ¯nancial institutions during
the sixties and the seventies in Africa.
3ous articles that apply the hierarchical-contractual approach to collusion, namely
asymmetric information on the e±ciency of the ¯rm, the present article extends
some results of the existing literature.2 Most of those mentioned articles gener-
ally assume that projects are always done and the supervisors in the hierarchies
have no real interest on them. Therefore those articles concentrate the attention
only on the problem of cost-padding. As we also relax both assumptions, by
endogenizing the decisions about the undertaking of a project in the jurisdiction
of an interested authority, we are able to describe and analyze the following sit-
uation, which represents a di®erent misbehavior from those already considered.
In order to obtain grants to undertake a low (but non zero) valued project in
its jurisdiction, a local authority can negotiate with the ¯rm of constructors and
then present to the Federal Government a project for a local public work with a
high rate of return, by underestimating its real costs. Therefore an issue related
to the well-known problem of costs-overruns appears, but in a static framework
without any consideration of the Federal Government's lack of commitment.
We derive a \Collusion-Proofness" property to characterize the optimal allo-
cations. This property states that, without any of generality, the Federal Gov-
ernment can restrict itself to o®er collusion-proof contracts. Those contracts
include the decision about the undertaking of the project, a target cost if the
work should be done and the transfers to the Local Government and to the ¯rm
of constructors. As usual in the models with collusion and cost-padding, when
the project is undertaken, the target cost is generally distorted with respect to
the ¯rst-best. But the distortion is not the same if the project is always under-
taken or if it is constructed only by an e±cient ¯rm. In the ¯rst case, the well
known upward distortion for the ine±cient ¯rm emerges. But in the other case,
the Federal Government sets a target cost for the e±cient ¯rm that is lower than
the ¯rst-best. In order to attenuate these distortions, the Federal Government
makes di®erent kind of transfers to the Local Government: either conditional
non-lineal grants-in-aid if the project is done or positive compensations in case
of shutdown. Finally the Federal Government decides to distort the decisions
that concern the undertaking of a particular project. The most interesting result
states that useless projects are nevertheless undertaken at an in°ated cost.
This paper is related to di®erent recent literatures. First of all, we adopt a
contractual approach to analyze the allocations in decentralized organizations,
as advocated in Caillaud, Jullien and Picard (1996) and Cremer, Estache and
Seabright (1996). We also ¯x the organizational framework, similar to the \regu-
latory capture" approach. As in La®ont and Tirole (1991 and 1993), we analyze
a hierarchy. But unlike them, we do not allow the top level of the hierarchy to
communicate with the lowest level (in our case, the ¯rm). Because there are
2This literature started with the book of Rose-Ackerman (1978). The ¯rst attempt to
formalize rigorously her intuitions appeared in the seminal article of Tirole (1986). For a recent
survey of the contractual approach to collusion in organizations, see La®ont and Rochet (1997).
4costs in the channels of communication, the Federal Government delegates to the
Local Government the task of ¯nding the best projects for its jurisdiction and
the most e±cient ¯rm to undertake them. The local authority is hence an \in-
termediate" type of supervisor. We qualify it in this way because, as the Local
Government is interested in the e®ective undertaking of the project, it is neither
the neutral supervisor depicted in the auditing literature nor the productive one
as formalized in the articles that analyze the problems of delegation.3 In fact we
can say that the local government behaves like the agent in the model of Aghion
and Tirole (1997). As was indirectly quoted above, we will not try to ¯nd the
optimal organization in the presence of the threat of collusion.4
We analyze corruption using an informational and contractual approach. Fol-
lowing Tirole (1986), the Local Government will be asked to report its private
information in order to enable the Federal Government to implement the ¯nal al-
location. In this setting, corruption is formalized as the result of side-contracting
between the Local Government and the manager of the ¯rm of constructors.
This side-contract would stipulate how the Local Government should manipulate
and misreport and then the covert-transfers to set between the corrupt agents.
Although our model is an \incomplete-contract" one (because of the broken com-
munication between the Federal Government and the ¯rm of constructors), we are
able to prove a \Collusion-Proofness" property. Therefore, unlike Kofman and
Lawarr¶ ee (1996), an incentive-compatible collusion-proof allocation dominates in
equilibrium.
Finally our paper is also related with a growing literature on incentives and ¯s-
cal federal systems. Although the ¯scal federalism approach is based on informa-
tional issues (see Oates (1972)), only recently some authors have rigorously study
the incentive problems that emerge in such organizational frameworks, among
them Gilbert and Picard (1996), Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau (1996), Bucov-
etsky, Marchand and Pestieau (1998), Lockwood (1999) and Boadway, Horiba
and Jha (1999). Even if none of these consider the problem of corruption at the
local level, the informational structure of our model and some results are simi-
lar to them. We endogenize the structure of the transfers within the hierarchy,
like Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau (1996) did. Although our results do not
concern the same type of agents and are more general, we ¯nd the same costs
distortions than Boadway, Horiba and Jha (1999). Moreover we obtain exactly
the opposite distortions than Lockwood (1999). Finally we observe under and
over-construction of local public works, like Bucovetsky, Marchand and Pestieau
3On one hand, the auditing literature followed Antle (1982) by assuming that the person in
charge of controlling the productive agent takes only in account his retribution, independently
of the action decided by the principal. On the other hand, the delegation approach as set
in Baron and Besanko (1992) and Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992 and 1995)
formalizes the supervisor as a productive agent.
4There are some recent articles that analyze this issue, as La®ont and Martimort (1996 and
1998) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998).
5(1998) and Lockwood (1999), again in the opposite way with suspect to Lock-
wood's results.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the
model and its timing. Section 3 presents the benchmark: the optimal contracts
when collusion is infeasible. Next we discuss about the possibility of collusion
and we prove a \Collusion-Proofness" property. In Section 5 we ¯nd the cost-
minimizing collusion-proof contracts. In Section 6 we show the optimal contracts
and then we conclude. All proofs are shown in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a national government as a hierarchy, whose highest level is the
Federal Government (FG) and then comes below a Local Government (LG). The
Federal Government must decide, following a report made by the Local Govern-
ment, whether to ¯nance a local public project. If the project is undertaken, the
total bene¯ts for the population are NB = LB + SB where NB;LB and SB
stands respectively for \national", \local" and \spillover" bene¯ts. The last two
values are strictly positive and perfectly separable between the region where the
project is to be done and the rest of the country. Both are common knowledge.
The unique candidate to undertake the project is a ¯rm of constructors (F).
If the project is done, its ex-post observable cost is C = µ ¡ e, where µ is an
e±ciency parameter (the ¯rm's type) and e is the e®ort exerted by the ¯rm to
reduce costs. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that µ 2 £ = fµl;µhg and
4µ ´ µh ¡ µl > 0: The ¯rm faces a monetary equivalent cost of e®ort ª(e). The
function ª : I R ! I R is only de¯ned over the positives and is always positive,
strictly increasing and convex. In order to ensure an interior solution, we assume
that ª(e) = 0 and lim
e!µ ª(e) = +1. Moreover
ª00
ª0 is strictly increasing, which
implies that ª000 > 0. We adopt an accounting convention that the cost C is
totally reimbursed by FG. The utility of the ¯rm is
U ´ t+ b ¡ ±ª(e)
where ± = 1 if the project is undertaken and 0 otherwise. t is the net transfer
received from FG and b is a side-payment from LG. The ¯rm's reservation utility
level is normalized to 0 so its participation constraint is U ¸ 0.
The Local Government is benevolent with respect to its constituency. LG
knows the ¯rm's type µ and its task is to make a report to FG. As people living
in this jurisdiction enjoy LB, the local authority gains from the undertaking of
the project. There are also monetary transfers s between FG and LG. We do
not impose a priori neither the form nor the direction of these transfers. When
s ¸ 0, FG compensates the region. As the local authority has the power to levy
taxes, FG can impose s < 0 to LG. Moreover, the Local Government can also
6make transfers to the ¯rm of constructors, transfers that can be either positive
or negative. So LG's utility function is
V ´ ±LB + v(s ¡ b)
where the strictly increasing, concave and di®erentiable real-valued function v(x)
captures the impact of both kind of transfers on the local welfare. We assume
that v(0) = 0 and v0(0) = 1 + ¸; where ¸ > 0 is the shadow cost of public
funds raised by all other jurisdictions. The retained formalization for v is an
approximation that captures the most important features of the public ¯nances
of the region where the project is to be undertaken. LG's participation constraint
is V ¸ 0. This constraint re°ects implicitly that FG can prohibit LG to undertake
the project by himself.
The Federal Government seeks to maximize the national social welfare and
wants the project to be undertaken provided that it has a positive social value.
But FG is unable to distinguish between the two components of the cost C: In
order to ¯ll this informational gap, FG must rely on a report made by LG. The
fact that both levels of authority represent di®erent populations will create a
con°ict of interests. To deal with, FG faces a mechanism-design problem. FG
o®ers to LG a public works contract: a pair
fM;y(f m)g






as a vectorial function of the LG's report f m 2 M. ¼ is a penalty for LG when
the project is accepted by FG but rejected by the ¯rm (see the timing below).
The social welfare criterion is given by
W ´ ±[SB ¡(1 + ¸)C] ¡ (1 + ¸)(t + s) + U + V
= ±[NB ¡ (1 + ¸)(C + ª(e))] ¡ ¸U ¡ d(s ¡ b)
where d(s ¡b) ´ (1 + ¸)(s ¡b) ¡v(s ¡ b) is the deadweight loss function gener-
ated by the inter-jurisdictional transfers s and the side-payments b. FG dislikes
to leave any extra rent to the manager of the ¯rm because ¸ > 0.
The timing of the model is as follows
1. Nature randomly selects µ: F and LG observe this value.
2. FG designs and o®ers the public works contract to LG.
73. Collusion between LG and F may take place.
4. LG either rejects or accepts the public works contract. If, on one hand, LG
rejects, the game ends. LG and F get their reservation utilities. On the
other hand, after accepting, LG must report to FG. Then the latter decides,
by imposing ±(f m); if the project should be shutdown or undertaken.
(a) If ±(f m) = 0; to = 0 and e so = so(f m) are made.
(b) If ±(f m) = 1; FG communicates to LG the corresponding cost-transfer
scheme to o®er to the ¯rm (i.e. the couple of values e C = C(f m) and
e t = t(f m)). F can refuse or accept this proposal.
i. If F refuses, FG imposes the penalty ¼ to LG: a ¯ne f > 0 and
the shutdown of the planned project.5
ii. If F accepts, the project is undertaken and all transfers are made.
As we can see, there is no direct communication between the Federal Govern-
ment and the ¯rm because the latter does not report its type. F only announces
publicly if it accepts or refuses the cost-transfer scheme ( e C; e t ); perhaps after
a covert negotiation with LG. This seems to be a realistic assumption because,
for local public works, there is usually no communication between the central
government and the ¯rm in charge of the construction. This re°ects \decentral-
ization" in a contractual sense, as set in Caillaud, Jullien and Picard (1996): FG
delegates to LG the search of the ¯rm to undertake the local project.
But more important is the consequence of the possibility of side-contracting
and the retained timing. In our previous article where side-contracts are infeasible
(see Besfamille (1999)), there is already a trade-o® in the incentives of LG to
misreport the type of the ¯rm. Because LG is indeed interested in the e®ective
undertaking of the project, it might be tempted to make a report to induce it.
Nevertheless, it is limited by the fact that, when a project is accepted by FG,
the cost-transfer scheme ( e C; e t ) to o®er to ¯rm depends on the report f m: And, in
case of refusal by F, LG is penalized. But in this model, LG can attenuate this
trade-o® by coordinating his announcement with F.
We adopt some methodological assumptions. The ¯rst one is common in in-
centive theory: the full commitment for the public works contract. The other
two assumptions are more speci¯c. We assume that FG can imperfectly control
the communication between LG and F. On one hand, when FG accepts to under-
take a project and communicates to LG the cost-transfer scheme ( e C; e t ); LG can
not propose to F a di®erent cost-transfer pair. On the other hand, side-transfers
(or their monetary equivalent) between LG and F are feasible and can not be
controlled by FG. Therefore, in this model, the only way for LG to misbehave
5In this case, F gets its reservation utility.
8is trough its reporting strategy, reporting strategy that may be the result of a
covert negotiation with F.
This paper analyzes the optimal contract that FG o®ers to LG to obtain
its private information. We present two useful benchmarks: the full-information
contracts and the contracts that would have arisen under asymmetric information
on the ¯rm's type µ but when collusion is not feasible. Then we characterize the
optimal contract under asymmetric information on µ and collusion.
3 Optimal contracts when corruption is infeasi-
ble
In order to obtain the benchmarks, let's assume that side-contracts are not fea-
sible. Then if FG knows µ and can also observe e; the target values are: e¤;
C¤
l = µl ¡ e¤; C¤
h = µh ¡ e¤; t¤ = ª(e¤) and so = s¤ = 0: The optimal allocations
under full information are characterized as follows.6
Proposition 1 Suppose that the Federal Government knows the ¯rm's type µ
and can also observe the e®ort e: Then
² when µ = µl; the Federal Government optimally sets
{ ± = 0;to and so if LB < LB¤
Inf
{ ± = 1;C¤
l ;t¤ and s¤ if LB ¸ LB¤
Inf
where LB¤
Inf ´ (1 + ¸)(C¤
l + t¤) ¡ SB
² when µ = µh; the Federal Government optimally sets
{ ± = 0;to and so if LB < LB¤
Sup
{ ± = 1;C¤
h;t¤ and s¤ if LB ¸ LB¤
Sup
where LB¤
Sup ´ (1 + ¸)(C¤
h + t¤) ¡SB = LB¤
Inf + (1 + ¸)4µ
The comparative statics of these results are straightforward. On one hand,
when the shadow cost of public funds raised by FG, the lowest ¯rm's type, the
di®erential in e±ciency and the cost of e®ort increase, both thresholds also in-
crease. Hence FG funds fewer projects. On the other hand, when the spillover
e®ects are important, more local works are undertaken under full information.
Next assume that, although C is ex-post observable, FG can not distinguish
between µ and e. As it has some beliefs about µ, he faces two states of nature
i 2 fl;hg; each with a strictly positive probability pi ´ Pr(µ = µi). FG could
induce LG to reveal µ truthfully by o®ering him an incentive-compatible public
works contract. In fact, this is not necessary.
6This paper maintains a conventional assumption in contract theory. When F or LG are
indi®erent between two decisions, they do what FG prefers.
9Proposition 2 Under asymmetric information on the e±ciency of the ¯rm µ,
the optimal allocations that emerge under full information are incentive compat-
ible.
The formal proof appears in Besfamille (1999). Although there is asymmetric
information on µ; FG implements the optimal full information allocations with
no extra cost by o®ering, for each state of nature, a public works contract with
the corresponding allocation described in Proposition 1. This implies that, for
any positive value of the di®erential in e±ciency 4µ, at most three possible
con¯gurations of decisions concerning the undertaking of the project (±l;±h) can
arise:
² [All] : both types of ¯rm undertake the project if LB ¸ LB¤
Sup
µl µh
±l = 1 ±h = 1




±l = 1 ±h = 0
² [None] : if LB < LB¤
Inf the project is not undertaken
µl µh
±l = 0 ±h = 0
From now on, we call the pair (±l;±h) a \con¯guration of ¯rms". The ¯rst
and the last con¯guration of ¯rms do not discriminate between di®erent types
while the second does. These potential con¯gurations of ¯rms coincide with those
that would appear under full information. So asymmetric information does not
impact in such a way to make new con¯gurations of ¯rms arise. We gather these
results in the following ¯gure where, for a given value of µl; any point in the
graphic represents one project, characterized by the possible values of 4µ and
LB: The subscripts indicate that the con¯gurations of ¯rms are implemented by
a contract of full information allocations.
10D q  
LB   
[ All ] 
FI 
[ None  ] 
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Figure 1: Optimal con¯gurations of ¯rms when corruption is infeasible
4 Corruption
4.1 The covert negotiation: timing and assumptions
Now werelax the assumption that collusion is infeasible. Henceforth side-contracts
between the Local Government and the ¯rm of constructors are a possible threat
that must be taken in account by the Federal Government at the mechanism-
design stage. We characterize the optimal contracts in this new framework.
Prior to the acceptance of the public works contract o®ered by FG, LG might
want to coordinate the report to make with F. This covert-negotiation occurs
under complete information. Following Tirole (1986), LG o®ers to F a \take-it or
leave-it" side-contract. This side-contract, which is supposed to be fully enforce-
able, speci¯es the ¯nal report that LG should make and the covert-payment b
between them. If F rejects this side-contract, LG can only play non-cooperatively
the announcement game described in the timing. Therefore, in order to be
accepted, the side-contract must be Pareto-superior with respect to this non-
cooperative status quo.
4.2 A \Collusion-Proofness" property
As mentioned above, FG must be aware of the threat of collusion between LG and
F when it designs the best contract to o®er to LG. The optimization is di±cult
because we have not constrained the space of messages M in the public works
contract. Fortunately, we can prove the following important result.
Proposition 3 The allocations that maximize the expected welfare of the Federal
Government can be implemented by direct-revelation contracts. These contracts
11are collusion-proof because the Local Government does not gain by coordinating
with the ¯rm to deviate from truthful revelation.
FG can restrict himself, without any loss of generality, to o®er incentive-
compatible collusion-proof contracts to LG. To design those contracts, FG max-
imizes its expected welfare over the set of contracts that satisfy some collusion-
proofness constraints.
4.3 The stakes for collusion: existence
The optimal allocations that emerge under full information can obviously be
implemented through direct-revelation mechanisms. But these mechanisms are
not robust to collusion. If FG wants to implement the con¯guration of ¯rms [All]
by o®ering the contract
(
(± = 1;C¤
l ;t¤;s¤;¼) if µ = µl
(± = 1;C¤
h;t¤;s¤;¼) if µ = µh
the LG and F have incentives to misbehave. When µ = µl, LG can easily convince
the ¯rm that the best thing to do is to announce e µ = µh. By doing so, they could
share an informational rent ©(e¤) = ª(e¤)¡ª(e¤¡4µ) > 0:7 This threat of cost
padding always exists:
But in this model another coalitional misbehavior may appear. When FG
wants to discriminate between di®erent types of ¯rms to undertake the project,
it can o®er the contract
(
(± = 1;C¤
l ;t¤;s¤;¼) if µ = µl
(± = 0;to;so) if µ = µh
When µ = µh, LG might have an incentive to exaggerate the e±ciency of the ¯rm
by announcing e µ = µl in order to obtain the undertaking of the project. Without
corruption, this is impossible. The reason is simple: LG can not avoid F's refusal
of the cost-transfer scheme proposed by FG. But here LG can induce an ine±cient
¯rm to accept the cost-transfer scheme (C¤
l ;t¤) designed for an e±cient one. To
obtain that, LG should commit to compensate the ine±cient ¯rm for the extra
e®ort needed to attain the target cost C¤
l . So this stake for collusion exists if and
only if
LB + v(¡©(e
¤ + 4µ)) > 0
The following lemma states that it is a real threat for FG
Lemma 1 For any positive value of the local bene¯t of the project LB, there









;LB + v(¡©(e¤ + 4µ)) > 0:
7Because of the initial assumptions on ª; the function ©(e) veri¯es ©(e) ¸ 0;©0(e) > 0 and
©00(e) > 0:
12When FG wants to implement the con¯guration of ¯rms [µl]; there is always
room for this stake of collusion if the di®erential in e±ciency 4µ is low enough.
In contrast, when this parameter is high, this stake for collusion disappears be-
cause it is too expensive for LG to compensate the ¯rm for the extra e®ort. This
organizational misbehavior concerns LG's subvaluating the cost to obtain the un-
dertaking of the project. Although it seems to be a very widespread phenomenon
in public investments, it has only been studied in the literature of cost-overruns
from a dynamic perspective, with renegotiation and no-commitment as an is-
sue. Here this problem emerges as a consequence of corruption within a federal
hierarchy.
5 Optimal contracts under the threat of corrup-
tion
5.1 Cost-minimizing collusion-proof contracts
First of all, we ¯nd the cost-minimizing collusion-proof contracts that implement
each possible con¯guration of ¯rms. In order to design them, FG must face the
following constraints
² IR(i) and FIR(i) : the participation constraint for LG and F respectively.
² CPC(i) : the collusion-proofness constraints for LG. They are given by the
following two expressions. The ¯rst collusion-proofness constraint is
±lLB + v(sl) ¸ ±h[LB + v(sh + Uh + ©(eh) ¡ Ul)]
+(1 ¡±h)v(sh + Uh ¡ Ul)
(CPC(l))
This constraint enables FG to deter the coalitional misbehavior implied by
the subvaluation of the e±ciency of the ¯rm to gain the informational rent
©(eh). By compensating enough LG in state l, up to the maximum bribe
that F is willing to pay in order to obtain the extra informational rent, FG
can induce truthful revelation.
The other collusion-proofness constraint is
±hLB + v(sh) ¸ ±l[LB + v(sl + Ul ¡©(el + 4µ) ¡Uh)]
+(1 ¡ ±l)v(sl + Ul ¡ Uh)
(CPC(h))
Now, in order to deter the subvaluation of the cost, LG must gain enough in
state h in order to not engaging with F in a socially non-desirable project.
13Thus, FG solves the problem
P
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It is straightforward to prove the following lemma
Lemma 2 An optimal contract must verify ±l ¸ ±h:
Hence at most the three mentioned con¯gurations of ¯rms can arise at the
optimum. Next we show the cost-minimizing collusion-proof contract that im-
plements each possible con¯guration of ¯rms. When FG wants the shutdown of
the project, no matter the e±ciency of the ¯rm, it can obtain that by o®ering
a menu of full information allocations because this con¯guration of ¯rms [None]
is collusion-proof per se. But this is not the case for the other two potential
con¯gurations of ¯rms [µl] and [All]:
When collusion is infeasible, FG does not distort neither the cost of the project
nor the utility of the ¯rm. But a priori, this is not optimal any more because
both variables enter in the new constraints CPC(i): Thus FG can distort them
in order to attenuate the overall costs of implementation. Moreover, as there are
two potential misbehaviors, we show that there are also two di®erent types of
cost-distortions in equilibrium, that characterize each con¯guration of ¯rms.8
Proposition 4 The cost-minimizing contract that implements the con¯guration
of ¯rms [All]CP is (
(± = 1;C¤
l ;tl;sl;¼) if µ = µl
(± = 1;Ch;th;sh;¼) if µ = µh
where
² sl > 0 and sh < 0
² sl = sh + ©(eh) and LB + v(sh) ¸ 0
² Ch > C¤
h; th < t¤ and Uh = th ¡ ª(µh ¡ Ch) = 0
² Ul = tl ¡ ª(µl ¡ C¤
l ) ¸ 0
8Now the superscripts will indicate that the con¯gurations of ¯rms are implemented by
collusion-proof contracts.
14When FG implements the con¯guration of ¯rms [All]CP; it must distort up-
wardly the cost imposed to the ine±cient ¯rm. Not surprisingly, this is the same
result that we can ¯nd in La®ont and Tirole (1991, 1993). The trade-o® between
rent extraction and e±ciency is solved by imposing a cost for the ine±cient ¯rm
Ch that is higher than the full information cost C¤
h. But in this model, a fraction
of this higher cost must be paid by LG. In fact, FG funds the project by a con-
ditional non-lineal matching grant. As usual, there is no \distortion at the top"
because the lowest cost is not distorted. But in state l FG should o®er to LG a
positive compensation sl to relax the collusion-proofness constraint. When this
compensation is relatively low, the ¯rm does not enjoy any rent; all the imple-
mentation cost is paid to the LG. But when the deadweight loss associated to sl
increases and thus it arrives to a threshold, FG starts to o®er a net transfer to F
such that Ul > 0:
Proposition 5 The cost-minimizing contract that implements the con¯guration
of ¯rms [µl]CP is (
(± = 1;Cl;tl;sl;¼) if µ = µl
(± = 0;to;sh;¼) if µ = µh
where
² sl < 0 and sh > 0
² v(sh) = LB + v(sl ¡ ©(el + 4µ))
² Cl < C¤
l ; tl > t¤ and Ul = tl ¡ª(µl ¡ Cl) = 0
When FG faces the threat of cost subvaluation and tries to implement the
con¯guration of ¯rms [µl]CP; it must distort downwardly the target cost imposed
to the e±cient ¯rm. This implies that the ¯rm that will e®ectively undertake the
project should exert a level of e®ort el; higher than the full information level e¤.
By doing that, FG increases the side-transfer that LG should pay to an ine±cient
¯rm in order to compensate it to mimic an e±cient ¯rm and to undertake the
project. As before, FG designs for LG a cost-sharing formula when the project
should be done and o®ers a strictly positive compensation scheme in the other
case. Moreover, the utility of the ¯rm remains unchanged, at its reservation level.
5.2 The optimal contracts
Once the cost-minimizing collusion-proof contracts are found, it is straightfor-
ward to compute the expected welfare of the Federal Government under each
con¯guration of ¯rms and to look for which values of 4µ and LB the Federal
Government implements each possible con¯guration.
15Proposition 6 Under asymmetric information on the e±ciency of the ¯rm µ
and collusion between the Local Government and the ¯rm of constructors, the
optimal con¯gurations of ¯rms are set as in the following graphic.
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Figure 2: Optimal con¯gurations of ¯rms under the threat of corruption
The graphic shows that, for every con¯guration of ¯rms, there exists a non-
empty parametric region where it is optimal to implement it. Collusion is not so
constraining so as to make one con¯guration of ¯rms completely disappearing.
Collusion entails upward and downward distortions of the optimal decisions
± about the e®ective undertaking of the project. Upward distortions occur only
when, instead of discriminating the ¯rms that will construct the project, FG
decides to undertake the work with both types of ¯rms. In the graphic this
happens when the con¯guration of ¯rms [All]CP is implemented instead of [µl]CP.
As we have shown in Proposition 4, the contract that implements the undertaking
of the project irrespective of the ¯rm's type sets an upwardly distorted target
cost for the ine±cient ¯rm. Therefore we obtain the most important result of this
paper because we show that the undertaking of useless projects at an in°ated cost
is an optimal response to the threat of corruption. Cost overruns for projects that
should not be undertaken emerge in a static setting, without any issue concerning
the contractual commitment. Downward distortions occur in two cases: when
FG decides to shutdown all works instead of discriminating between ¯rms and
also when the mentioned discrimination is preferred to the con¯guration of ¯rms
[All]CP:
These distortions can be very important. For 4µ ￿ 4µ, the con¯guration of
¯rms [µl]CP is no longer optimal and will not be implemented. In that case, when
FG wants to discriminate between ¯rms whose e±ciency does not di®er \too
much", the stake for collusion is large for LG and F. Therefore, the distortions in
the cost of the accepted project in state l and the amount of the transfers to LG
16needed to attenuate the implementation costs associated to this discrimination
are so important that FG shifts towards more drastic distortions in ±.
6 Conclusion
We summarize the main results of this paper. We consider a governmental hier-
archy, composed by a Federal Government and a Local Government. The former
delegates to the latter the task of ¯nding a ¯rm with the charge of constructing
a local public works that generates spillovers. The local authority is informed
about the e±ciency of the ¯rm and thus about the cost of the project. It must
communicate it to the Federal Government in order to obtain funds for the work.
We are able to show, in this setting, the allocative impact of collusion between
the Local Government and the ¯rm of constructors.
Our model endogenizes the decision about undertaking the local project.
When it should be done independently of its cost, then the usual stake for col-
lusion implying cost-padding arises. But when the project should be undertaken
only if it cost is low, the local authority may be tempted to overstate the e±ciency
of the ¯rm to obtain the funds to construct it.
Although our model is an incomplete-contract one, we prove a \Collusion-
Proofness" property which enables us to easily characterize the optimal alloca-
tions. Collusion-proofness yields to distortions concerning the cost of the project
and the decision about its e®ective undertaking. When the project should be
done, irrespectively of its costs, the latter are distorted upwardly if the ¯rm in
charge of the construction is ine±cient. But when the project should be under-
taken only if the ¯rm is e±cient, then the target cost is distorted downwardly.
Concerning the decisions about the undertaking of the work, we obtain a \two-
way" distortion result: more or less projects are done than under full-information.
The most important result concerns the emergence of cases where useless projects
are optimally undertaken, at an in°ated cost.
These distortions are more important than when collusion between the Local
Government and the ¯rm is infeasible, in two aspects. First of all, they appear
whereas in a collusion-free setting there are no room for them. Second, these
distortions may be so costly that, for a non negligeable region of parameters
of the model, the Federal Government abandons the discrimination of projects
according to their cost and shifts towards a more drastic way to decide about the
funding of local projects. Either they are always undertaken or, on the contrary,
always shutdown.
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197 Appendix
7.1 Proof of the \Collusion-Proofness" property
Following La®ont and Tirole (1991 and 1993), this proof is done in di®erent steps.
First of all we characterize the equilibrium allocations of overall announcement
game. Then we ¯nd the allocation that maximizes the expected welfare of FG.
Finally we show that this allocation can be implemented through an incentive-
compatible collusion-proof contract.
7.1.1 The equilibrium allocations
Any mechanism o®ered by FG leads to a side-contract between LG and the F and
to an equilibrium allocation.9 We index the ¯nal incomes, e®orts and utilities by
a hat: fb ti; b si; b ei; b Ui; b Vigi2fl;hg: The actual transfers from FG to LG and to F are
denoted by si and ti: If bi are the side-transfer between LG and F, we have:
b si = si ¡ bi
b ti = ti + bi
b Ui = b ti ¡±iª(b ei)
b Vi = ±iLB + v(b si)
Then, in any state of nature, the resulting FG's welfare is
c Wi ´ ±i[SB ¡ (1 + ¸)Ci] ¡ (1 + ¸)(ti + si) + b Ui + b Vi
= ±i[NB ¡ (1 + ¸)(Ci + ª(b ei))] ¡ ¸ b Ui ¡d(b si)
We characterize the equilibrium allocations for a particular con¯guration of
¯rms; the other two are strictly equivalent. Assume that FG wants to implement
the con¯guration of ¯rms [All]; where ±i = 1 8i 2 fl;hg. The necessary conditions
for an allocation to be an equilibrium are the following:
² State l : b Ul ¸ 0, b Vl ¸ 0 and one of the following possibilities concerning the
coalition incentive-compatibility constraints
{ Case l1 (
b Uh + ©(b eh) ¸ b Ul
v(b sl) ¸ v(b sh + b Uh + ©(b eh) ¡ b Ul)
F wants to obtain the cost-transfer scheme designed for an ine±cient
¯rm in state h but LG does not want that, even if the former gives to
the latter all bene¯ts from the desired deviation.
9This also embraces the possibility of a non-cooperative outcome.
20{ Case l2 8
> <
> :
b Uh + ©(b eh) ￿ b Ul
v(b sh) ¸ v(b sl)
v(b sl) ¸ v(b sh + b Uh + ©(b eh) ¡ b Ul)
Although LG wants to deviate, it is too expensive for it to obtain F's
acceptation.
² State h : b Uh ¸ 0; b Vh ¸ 0 and one of the following possibilities, whose
intuition are equivalent to the previous ones
{ Case h1 (
b Ul ¡ ©(b el + 4µ) ¸ b Uh
v(b sh) ¸ v(b sl + b Ul ¡ ©(b el + 4µ) ¡ b Uh)
{ Case h2 8
> <
> :
b Ul ¡ ©(b el + 4µ) ￿ b Uh
v(b sl) ¸ v(b sh)
v(b sh) ¸ v(b sl + b Ul ¡ ©(b el + 4µ) ¡ b Uh)
Any equilibrium allocation is characterized by a combination of one case for
each state of nature. Hence there are four possible cases of equilibrium outcomes,
denoted by (l1;h1);(l1;h2);(l2;h1) and (l2;h2).
7.1.2 The allocation that maximizes FG's expected welfare for each
case
As the aim of FG is to obtain the optimal equilibrium allocation, ¯rst we ¯nd,
in each one of the possible cases mentioned above, the allocation that maximizes
FG's expected welfare I Ec W.
21Case (l1;h1) : FG solves the program
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
Max
b el;b Ul;b sl
b eh;b Uh;b sh
I Ec W
subject to
b Ul ¸ 0 (1a)
b Uh ¸ 0 (1b)
LB + v(b sl) ¸ 0 (1c)
LB + v(b sh) ¸ 0 (1d)
b Uh + ©(b eh) ¸ b Ul (1e)
b Ul ¡ ©(b el + 4µ) ¸ b Uh (1f)
v(b sl) ¸ v(b sh + b Uh + ©(b eh) ¡ b Ul) (1g)
v(b sh) ¸ v(b sl + b Ul ¡ ©(b el + 4µ) ¡ b Uh) (1h)
If (1e);(1f);(1g) and (1h) hold, then b sl = b sh = 0: So (1e) and (1f) hold with
equality, implying b el + 4µ = b eh and therefore b el < b eh: Moreover, b Ul = ©(b el +
4µ) >0 and b Uh = 0: The Lagrangian of the reduced problem is:
L = ¡pl[(1 + ¸)(µl ¡ b el + ª(b el)) + ¸©(b el + 4µ)]
¡ph (1 + ¸)(µh ¡ b eh + ª(b eh)) + °[b el + 4µ ¡ b eh]
where ° is the multiplier associated with the equality constraint. The ¯rst-order
conditions yield to
ª








As b el < b eh; it is straightforward to see that b el < e¤ < b eh: With respect to the
full information allocation in the con¯guration of ¯rms [All]FI, this equilibrium
allocation generates an extra cost
C1 = pl[(1 + ¸)(H(b el) ¡ H(e¤)) + ¸©(b el + 4µ)]
+ph(1 + ¸)(H(b eh) ¡ H(e¤))
where the function H(e) ´ ª(e) ¡ e:
22Case (l1;h2) FG solves the program
Pa
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
Max
b el;b Ul;b sl
b eh;b Uh;b sh
I Ec W
subject to
b Ul ¸ 0 (2a)
b Uh ¸ 0 (2b)
LB + v(b sl) ¸ 0 (2c)
LB + v(b sh) ¸ 0 (2d)
b Uh + ©(b eh) ¸ b Ul (2e)
b Ul ¡ ©(b el + 4µ) ￿ b Uh (2f)
v(b sl) ¸ v(b sh + b Uh + ©(b eh) ¡ b Ul) (2g)
v(b sh) ¸ v(b sl + b Ul ¡ ©(b el + 4µ) ¡ b Uh) (2h)
If (2d);(2e) and (2g) hold, (2c) also holds. If (2g) and (2h) are veri¯ed, ©(b el +
4µ) ¸ ©(b eh) because the function v is monotonic. Therefore, this last inequality
combined with (2e) yields to (2f). The Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the reduced
problem are
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
¡pl(1 + ¸)(ª0(b el) ¡ 1) + °6v0(b sl + ¯)©0(b el + 4µ) = 0 (i1)
¡ph(1 + ¸)(ª0(b eh) ¡ 1) + °4©0(b eh) ¡ °5v0(b sh + ®)©0(b eh) = 0 (i2)
¡¸pl + °1 ¡ °4 + °5v0(b sh + ®) ¡°6v0(b sl + ¯) = 0 (i3)
¡¸ph + °2 + °4 ¡ °5v0(b sh + ®) + °6v0(b sl + ¯) = 0 (i4)
¡pld0(b sl) + °5v0(b sl) ¡ °6v0(b sl + ¯) = 0 (i5)
¡phd0(b sh) + °3v0(b sh) ¡°5v0(b sh + ®) + °6v0(b sh) = 0 (i6)
°1 b Ul = 0 °1 ¸ 0 (ii1)
°2 b Uh = 0 °2 ¸ 0 (ii2)
°3[LB + v(b sh)] = 0 °3 ¸ 0 (ii3)
°4[ b Uh + ©(b eh) ¡ b Ul] = 0 °4 ¸ 0 (ii4)
°5[v(b sl) ¡ v(b sh + ®)] = 0 °5 ¸ 0 (ii5)
°6[v(b sh) ¡ v(b sl + ¯)] = 0 °6 ¸ 0 (ii6)
where °j / j 2 f1;2;3;4;5;6g are the multipliers associated with the inequality
constraints, ® ´ b Uh + ©(b eh) ¡ b Ul ¸ 0 and ¯ ´ b Ul ¡ ©(b el + 4µ) ¡ b Uh ￿ 0:
1. From (i3) and (i4); °1 + °2 = ¸:
2. Then we show that °6 = 0: Assume °6 > 0: Hence, from (ii6); b sh = b sl + ¯
and from (i1); b el > e¤: But if (ii5) holds, it yields to b eh ￿ b el + 4µ:
23(a) If b eh = b el + 4µ; b eh > e¤: But from (i2); this should imply that °4 ¡
°5v0(b sh + ®) > 0 and therefore °4 > 0: If so, ® = 0 and b Ul > 0; which
then implies that °1 = 0: But (i3) becomes
0 > ¡¸pl ¡ °6v
0(b sl + ¯) = °4 ¡ °5v
0(b sh) > 0
which is a contradiction.
(b) If b eh < b el + 4µ; ® + ¯ < 0 and so (ii5) is slack, implying °5 = 0: If
this was the case, (i2) yields to
b eh ¸ e
¤
(i5) yields to b sl < 0 and (i6) yields to b sh ¸ 0: Hence, as ¯ ￿ 0
b sl < 0 ￿ b sh = b sl + ¯ ￿ b sl
which is another contradiction.
So °6 = 0 and b el = e¤: Moreover, (i5) becomes
pld
0(b sl) = °5v
0(b sl) (1)
so, as °5 ¸ 0; b sl ¸ 0:
3. Next we prove that b Uh+©(b eh) > b Ul: Assume that b Uh+©(b eh) = b Ul so ® = 0:
As ©(b eh) > 0; b Ul > 0 and so °1 = 0: In that case, (i3) yields to °5 > 0 and
b sh = b sl: This equality, combined with (i6); yields to
°3v
0(b sh) = d
0(b sh)
which implies that b sh ¸ 0 and therefore °3 = 0 because (ii3) is slack. If so,
b sh = 0: But then, b sl = 0 which must imply that °5 = 0 in order to satisfy
(1). But this is a contradiction.
So ® ´ b Uh + ©(b eh) ¡ b Ul > 0 and therefore °4 = 0: If so, (i4) becomes
°2 = ¸ph + °5v
0(b sh + ®) > 0
so b Uh = 0:
4. Next we prove that b sl > 0: Assume b sl = 0: Hence °5 = 0 and (i6) becomes
°3v
0(b sh) = d
0(b sh)
which yields to b sh ¸ 0: But from (ii5) and the fact that ® > 0
0 = b sl ¸ b sh + ® > 0
which is obviously a contradiction.
Hence b sl > 0 so, from (1), °5 > 0 and therefore b sl = b sh + ® and b eh < e¤
from (i2):
245. Next we show for each values of the parameters 4µ and LB the partici-
pation constraints (2a) and (2d) bind: Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions,
it is straightforward to see the result in the following graphic, where the
frontiers are drawn applying the Implicit Function Theorem.
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The particular values depicted there are characterized as follows. Let e sh be
de¯ned by
v
0(e sh) = 1 +
¸
ph
e sl be de¯ned by
v
0(e sl) = 1
and LB0 by
v(e sh) + LB
0 = 0
When (2a) is slack, b eh is characterized by the following expression
ª







so 4µ0 is de¯ned by
©(b eh(4µ
0)) = e sl ¡ e sh
and 4µ00 by
©(b eh(4µ
00)) = e sl
25This allocation generates an extra cost
C2 = pld(b sl) + ph [(1 + ¸)(H(b eh) ¡H(e¤)) + d(b sh)] if (2a) binds
pl
h
d(e sl) + ¸ b Ul
i
+ ph[(1 + ¸)(H(b eh) ¡ H(e¤)) + d(b sh)] if (2a) is slack
Case (l2;h1) FG solves the program
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
Max
b el;b Ul;b sl
b eh;b Uh;b sh
I Ec W
subject to
b Ul ¸ 0 (3a)
b Uh ¸ 0 (3b)
LB + v(b sl) ¸ 0 (3c)
LB + v(b sh) ¸ 0 (3d)
b Uh + ©(b eh) ￿ b Ul (3e)
b Ul ¡©(b el + 4µ) ¸ b Uh (3f)
v(b sh) ¸ v(b sl) ¸ v(b sh + b Uh + ©(b eh) ¡ b Ul) (3g)
v(b sh) ¸ v(b sl + b Ul ¡ ©(b el + 4µ) ¡ b Uh) (3h)
If (3b) and (3e) hold, then (3a) also holds. If (3f) and (3h) hold, (3g) also holds.
If (3c) and (3h) hold, then (3d) is satis¯ed. So the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of
the reduced problem are
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
¡pl(1 + ¸)(ª0(b el) ¡ 1) + [°6v0(b sl + ¯) ¡ °4]©0(b el + 4µ) = 0 (i1)
¡ph(1 + ¸)(ª0(b eh) ¡1) ¡ [°3 + °5v0(b sh + ®)]©0(b eh) = 0 (i2)
¡¸pl + °3 + °4 + °5v0(b sh + ®) ¡ °6v0(b sl + ¯) = 0 (i3)
¡¸ph + °1 ¡ °3 ¡ °4 ¡°5v0(b sh + ®) + °6v0(b sl + ¯) = 0 (i4)
¡pld0(b sl) + °2v0(b sl) + °5v0(b sl) ¡ °6v0(b sl + ¯) = 0 (i5)
¡phd0(b sh) ¡°5v0(b sh + ®) + °6v0(b sh) = 0 (i6)
°1 b Uh = 0 °1 ¸ 0 (ii1)
°2[LB + v(b sh)] = 0 °2 ¸ 0 (ii2)
°3[b Ul ¡ b Uh ¡ ©(b eh)] = 0 °3 ¸ 0 (ii3)
°4[b Ul ¡ b Uh ¡ ©(b el + 4µ)] = 0 °4 ¸ 0 (ii4)
°5[v(b sl) ¡ v(b sh + ®)] = 0 °5 ¸ 0 (ii5)
°6[v(b sh) ¡ v(b sl + ¯)] = 0 °6 ¸ 0 (ii6)
where ® ￿ 0 and ¯ ¸ 0: For the moment, we assume that (ii2) is slack. Then we
have to verify this statement.
1. From (i3) and (i4); °1 = ¸ > 0: Hence b Uh = 0:
262. Next we show that at the maximum b Ul = ©(b el + 4µ): If we assume that
b Ul > ©(b el +4µ), we must have °4 = 0: We show that this statement yields
to a global contradiction. We can have either °6 = 0 or °6 > 0:
² If °6 = 0; from (i1); b el = e¤ and from (i4)
°3 + °5v
0(b sh + ®) = ¸pl > 0 (2)
which implies that b eh < e¤: So ©(b eh) < ©(e¤) < ©(b el + 4µ): Hence
b Ul > ©(b eh) so ® < 0 and °3 = 0: If so, (2) imply that °5 > 0 so
b sl = b sh + ® (3)
which yields to b sl < b sh because ® < 0 . Plugging (2) in (i6) yields to
b sh < 0 so, from (3); b sl < 0: But also plugging (2) and (3) in (i5) yields
to b sl ¸ 0 which is a contradiction.
² If °6 > 0, b sh = b sl + ¯; b el > e¤ and from (i3)
0 < ¸pl + °6v
0(b sl + ¯) = °3 + °5v
0(b sh + ®)
so b eh < e¤: Hence b Ul > ©(b eh) and °3 = 0: If so, °5 > 0 and therefore
(2) holds again. But combined with the value of b sh; it follows that
©(b eh) = ©(b el + 4µ) which is a contradiction.
So b Ul = ©(b el + 4µ) and therefore ¯ = 0: As (ii5) and (ii6) hold, v(b sh) ¸
v(b sl) ¸ v(b sh + ®):
3. Next we show that b sh = b sl: Assume b sh > b sl so °6 = 0: (i5) yields to b sl ¸ 0
while (i6) to b sh ￿ 0, so by the assumption, b sl < 0 which is a contradiction.
So as b sh = b sl; (i5) becomes




and, as ® ￿ 0; (i6) becomes
phd
0(b sh) = °6v
0(b sh) ¡ °5v
0(b sh + ®) ￿ (°6 ¡°5)v
0(b sh)
Combining the equality between the transfers to LG and (4); we obtain
b sh = b sl ￿ 0:
4. Next we show that, at the maximum, ©(b el + 4µ) > ©(b eh): Assume they
are equal. Hence ® = 0 and b el < b el + 4µ = b eh ￿ e¤ so
b el < e
¤ (5)
27(i6) yields to
°6 ¡ °5 =
pld0(b sh)
v0(b sh)
Combining this last expression with (4) yields to b sh = b sl = 0 and hence




ª0(b el) = 1 + 1
pl(1+¸)[°6(1 + ¸) ¡ °4]©0(b eh)
ª0(b eh) = 1 ¡
1
ph(1+¸)[°3 + °6(1 + ¸)]©0(b eh)
°3 = ¸pl ¡ °4
From the ¯rst equation, we can obtain
°6©
0(b eh) = pl[ª















But from (5); ª0(b el) < 1 so ª0(b eh) > 1 which is a contradiction. Hence
©(b el + 4µ) > ©(b eh):
5. As a consequence of the previous result, ® < 0 so °5 = 0 and (ii3) is
slack so also °3 = 0: But then °3 = °5 = 0 so b eh = e¤ and from (i3);
°4 ¡ °6v0(b sl) = ¸pl > 0 so b el < e¤:





which yields to °6 = 0 as the only compatible solution. So b sl = b sh = 0 and
°4 = ¸pl:
This allocation generates a cost of implementation
C3 = pl[(1 + ¸)(H(b el) ¡ H(e¤)) + ¸©(b el + 4µ))]
28Case (l2;h2) FG solves the program
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
Max
b el;b Ul;b sl
b eh;b Uh;b sh
I Ec W
subject to
b Ul ¸ 0 (4a)
b Uh ¸ 0 (4b)
LB + v(b sl) ¸ 0 (4c)
LB + v(b sh) ¸ 0 (4d)
b Uh + ©(b eh) ￿ b Ul (4e)
b Ul ¡ ©(b el + 4µ) ￿ b Uh (4f)
v(b sh) ¸ v(b sl) ¸ v(b sh + b Uh + ©(b eh) ¡ b Ul) (4g)
v(b sl) ¸ v(b sh) ¸ v(b sl + b Ul ¡©(b el + 4µ) ¡ b Uh) (4h)
If (4b) and (4e) hold, then (4a) is satis¯ed. If (4g) and (4h) hold, then b sl = b sh = 0:
So if (4d) holds, then (4c) also holds. So (4e) and (4f) hold with equality,
implying that b el+4µ = b eh and therefore b el < b eh: Moreover, b Ul = ©(b el+4µ) > 0
and b Uh = 0: This case is formally identical with the ¯rst case (l1;h1) so its
implementation cost veri¯es C4= C1.
7.1.3 The optimal allocation
Although FG can implement the con¯guration of ¯rms [All] in four di®erent ways,
it will do it with the one that minimizes the extra cost. So we compare them:
As for each value of 4µ there exist a solution for the di®erent programs, we can
show that
1. lim
4µ!0+ C1 = lim
4µ!0+ C2 = lim
4µ!0+ C3 = 0
2. Next we apply the Envelope Theorem to compute the derivatives of the
di®erent costs with respect to 4µ.










= (ph + ¸)(ª
0(b eh) ¡1) + ¸pl > ¸pl
because, as b eh > e¤; ª0(b eh) > 1:









d4µ = pld0(b sl)(ª0(b eh ¡ 4µ) if b Ul = 0
= pl¸ª0(b eh ¡ 4µ) if b Ul > 0








0(b el + 4µ) > ¸pl
The ¯nal result is immediate. FG implements the con¯guration of ¯rms [All]
by o®ering a contract that yields to the second case of equilibrium allocation be-
cause this case minimizes the implementation costs. It is straightforward to verify
that this allocation can also be implemented by a direct-revelation collusion-proof
public works contract, with no bribes in equilibrium
7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Takeon arbitrary combination of parameters and functions ¤ = (SB;¸;pi;µl;ª;v)
of the model. Then take any given LB > 0: We try to ¯nd if there exist values
of 4µ such that
LB + v(¡©(e
¤ + 4µ)) ¸ 0 (6)
We analyze the shape of the function GLB(4µ) ´ LB + v(¡©(e¤ + 4µ)):
² lim
4µ!0+ GLB = LB > 0
²
dGLB
d4µ = ¡v0(¡©(e¤ + 4µ))ª0(e¤ + 4µ) < ¡(1 + ¸) < 0
²
d2GLB
d4µ2 = v00(¡©(e¤ + 4µ))ª0(e¤ + 4µ) ¡ v0(¡©(e¤ + 4µ)ª00(e¤ + 4µ) < 0
So there exists a unique value 4µLB > 0 such that GLB(4µLB) = 0: Hence
we have found an open non-empty interval (0;4µLB] where 84µ ￿ 4µLB ;
GLB(4µ) ¸ 0
307.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Assume that an optimal contract yields to ±l < ±h (i.e. ±l = 0 and ±h = 1):
From the collusion-proofness constraints we can state that v(sl) > 0 and Uh > 0:
Moreover, in order to attenuate the distortions in the transfers, eh ￿ e¤: Hence
I EW[±l=0;±h=1] = ¡pld(sl) + phfNB ¡(1 + ¸)(Ch + ª(eh)) ¡ ¸Uh ¡ d(sh)g
where, at least, v(sl) ¸ LB + v(sh + Uh + ©(eh)): But if this con¯guration
of ¯rms is implemented, it means that I EW[±l=0;±h=1] ¸ 0 or equivalently that
NB¡(1 + ¸)(Ch + ª(eh))¡¸Uh¡d(sh) > 0: But as NB¡(1 + ¸)(Ch + ª(eh))¡
¸Uh ¡ d(sh) < NB ¡ (1 + ¸)(C¤
l + ª(e¤)); it is worth to undertake the project
in the state l: So this con¯guration of ¯rms is always dominated by another when
the project is undertaken in both states of nature and letting Ul = 0 and el = e¤,
which is a contradiction
7.4 Cost-minimizing collusion-proof contracts
7.4.1 [All]CP
The cost-minimizing collusion-proof contract that implements the con¯guration
of ¯rms [All]CP solves the following problem
P1
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <




plfNB ¡ (1 + ¸)(µl ¡ el + ª(el)) ¡ ¸Ul ¡d(sl)g+
phfNB ¡ (1 + ¸)(µh ¡ eh + ª(eh)) ¡ ¸Uh ¡ d(sh)g
subject to
Ul ¸ 0 FIR(l)
Uh ¸ 0 FIR(h)
LB + v(sl) ¸ 0 IR(l)
LB + v(sh) ¸ 0 IR(h)
v(b sl) ¸ v(sh + Uh + ©(eh) ¡ Ul) CPC(l)
v(sh) ¸ v(sl + Ul ¡ ©(el + 4µ) ¡Uh) CPC(h)
Taking into account the fact that the constraint (2e) in the case (l1;h2) is always
slack, P1 is formally equivalent than the program Pa. Therefore the solutions are
also the same, so el = e¤;eh = b eh;sl = b sl;sh = b sh and Ul = b Ul. The values of 4µ
and LB for which FIR(l) and IR(h) bind can be seen in Figure 3.
7.4.2 [µl]CP
We characterize the cost-minimizing collusion-proof contract that implements
the con¯guration of ¯rms [µl]CP when, by assumption, the stake for collusion is
31e®ective. This is true for values that verify
LB + v(¡©(e
¤ + 4µ)) > 0 (7)
FG must solve the following problem
P2
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <




plfNB ¡ (1 + ¸)(µl ¡ el + ª(el)) ¡ ¸Ul ¡ d(sl)g
¡phd(sh)
subject to
Ul ¸ 0 FIR(l)
LB + v(sl) ¸ 0 IR(l)
v(sh) ¸ 0 IR(h)
LB + v(sl) ¸ v(sh ¡Ul) CPC(l)
v(sh) ¸ LB + v(sl + Ul ¡ ©(el + 4µ)) CPC(h)
We forget for the moment CPC(l). Then we check if the solution veri¯es it. The
Kuhn-Tucker conditions of P2 are
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
¡¸pl + °1 ¡ °5v0(sl + ¯) = 0 (i1)
¡pl(1 + ¸)(ª0(el) ¡ 1) + °4v0(sl + ¯)©0(el + 4µ) = 0 (i2)
¡pld0(sl) + °2v0(sl) ¡ °4v0(sl + ¯) = 0 (i3)
¡phd0(sh) + (°3 + °4)v0(sh) = 0 (i4)
°1Ul = 0 °1 ¸ 0 (ii1)
°2[LB + v(sl)] = 0 °2 ¸ 0 (ii2)
°3v(sh) = 0 °3 ¸ 0 (ii3)
°4[v(sh) ¡ LB ¡ v(sl + ¯)] = 0 °4 ¸ 0 (ii4)
where ¯ ´ Ul ¡ ©(el + 4µ):
1. By simple observation of (i1), °1 = ¸pl + °4v0(sl + ¯) > 0: Hence Ul = 0
and b < 0:
2. From (i2);
ª






0(el + 4µ) ¸ 1
which implies that el ¸ e¤:
3. Next we claim that v(sh) = LB + v(sl + ¯): Assume that v(sh) > LB +
v(sl + ¯) so °4 = 0: This has the following consequences:




0(sl) ¸ 0 (8)
In order to satisfy it, sl ¸ 0: Hence (ii2) is slack and then °2 = 0.
Therefore, to verify (8); sl = 0:
² (i4) becomes
°3v
0(sh) = ph(1 + ¸ ¡ v
0(sh)) (9)
So, from the initial assumption about the stake for collusion and the state-
ment at the beginning of this point, we have that
v(sh) > LB + v(¡©(e
¤ + 4µ)) > 0
which implies that v(sh) > 0 and so °3 = 0: But in that case, the only
way to satisfy (9) is by sh = 0; which is a contradiction. Hence v(sh) =
LB + v(sl + ¯).
4. As ¯ < 0 and (ii3) must hold,
LB + v(sl) > LB + v(sl + ¯) = v(sh) ¸ 0
so (ii2) is slack and °2 = 0: Moreover, CPC(l) is e®ectively slack.
5. Next we claim that °4 > 0: Assume that °4 = 0; which has the following
consequences




which implies that sl = 0
² (i4) becomes
°3v
0(sh) = ph(1 + ¸ ¡ v
0(sh)) (10)
But we have already proved that v(sh) = LB + v(sl + ¯) so v(sh) = LB +
v(¡©(e¤ + 4µ)) > 0 from the initial assumption. So sh > 0 and therefore
°3 = 0 if (ii4) has to be veri¯ed. But then, the only way to verify (10) is




0(sl + ¯) > 0
so sl < 0.
7. Next we claim that sh > 0: Assume that sh = 0 so v0(sh) = 1 + ¸: (i4)
becomes
(°3 + °4)(1 + ¸) = 0
which is a contradiction because we have already proved that °4 > 0: Hence
sh > 0 and then °3 = 0
337.5 Proof of Proposition 6
In order to draw the frontiers of the parametric regions where FG optimally
implements each con¯guration of ¯rms by o®ering the contracts characterized
above, we proceed by comparing the di®erent values of the expected welfare in
each case.
1. First of all, we compare I EW[All]CP and I EW[µl]CP. Let's compute
dI EW[All]CP
d4µ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
LB=LB¤
Sup












v0 (sl + ¯)
v0 (sh)
ª
0(el + 4µ) ¡ (1 + ¸)
#
when v(sh) + LB > 0 and Ul = 0:





n!1 (4µ)n = 0
(LB)n = LB¤
Sup = LB¤
Inf + (1 + ¸)(4µ)n
We know that
lim
n!1 I EW[All]CP = lim
n!1 I EW[µl]CP
Taking limits when n ! 1; we obtain
dI EW[All]CP
d4µ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
LB=LB¤
Sup




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
LB=LB¤
Sup
= pl(1 + ¸)





; when the di®erential in
e±ciency 4µ increases and LB = LB¤
Sup, FG strictly prefers to implement
the con¯guration of ¯rms [All]
CP instead of [µl]
CP whereas, under full in-
formation, it was indi®erent between them.
Moreover, we showed in Lemma 1 that, for su±ciently high values of 4µ;
the discrimination between di®erent ¯rms can be implemented by a menu
of full information allocations (i.e. without extra costs). Therefore, from




342. The comparison between the con¯guration of ¯rms [µl]CP and [None] is
straightforward. Take projects verifying 4µ 2 (0;4µ] and LB = LB¤
Inf.
The implementation of the ¯rst con¯guration of ¯rms yields to strictly
positive costs due to collusion-proofness. Therefore the second con¯gura-
tion dominates, whereas under full information FG was indi®erent between
them
35